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I examine the determinants of conflict and settlement by embedding probabilistic contests in a 
bargaining framework. Different costly enforcement efforts (e.g., arming, litigation expenditures) 
induce different disagreement points and Pareto frontiers. After examining the incentives for 
settlement, I demonstrate how different division rules and bargaining norms have real, economic 
effects. I then analyze some sources of conflict. I emphasize long-term, strategic considerations by 
examining an illustrative model and discussing particular historical examples.  
Why individuals, organized groups, or states engage in fighting and wars is a central problem for 
society as well as for the study of society, the social sciences. It is also a problem for the economy 
and for economics, as conflict and wars take away resources from production, destroy resources, 
and change the incentives for productive investment and innovation. Jack Hirshleifer spearheaded 
the study of conflict by the use of models of contests in which agents make costly choices between 
production and appropriation.
1 The relative levels of appropriative activities, usually interpreted as 
arms, determine the probability of each side winning in conflict or, sometimes equivalently, the 
share of the contested prize that each side receives. 
Although there is by now much accumulated research on conflict and contests, often no 
distinction is being made between probabilistic outcomes, in which one side wins and the others 
lose, and deterministic outcomes whereby each side receives a share of the prize that is contested. In 
this paper I will systematically examine the conditions that might lead to fighting and those that 
might lead to settlement under the threat of fighting; in Jack’s words, the distinction is between “hot 
wars” on the one hand and “cold wars” or “armed peace” on the other.
2 In doing so, I will attempt 
to synthesize previous research within a common framework but also point out some relatively new 
avenues for understanding when fighting can be expected to occur and when not. 
I first describe the basic setting whereby different types of probabilistic contests can be 
embedded within a bargaining framework. After choosing enforcement efforts (e.g., arming, 
litigation expenditures), which determine the probabilities of winning and losing for each party, the 
parties can engage in bargaining and settlement in the shadow of conflict. Because enforcement 
efforts are costly, in general both the disagreement point and the Pareto frontier faced by bargainers 
are endogenously determined. 
The different incentives to bargain and settle are then reviewed. Destruction and additional 
costs brought about by conflict, risk aversion, diminishing and decreasing returns, and 
complementarities in production or consumption provide strong incentives for bargaining and 
settlement. Where the adversaries end up, however, when they bargain and settle depends on the 
division rule or the bargaining norm that they subscribe to. Division rules that put more weight on 
the disagreement (or, threat) point tend to induce greater enforcement costs and thus induce lower 
levels of utility for all parties. That is, contrary to ordinary bargaining theory in which Pareto 
frontiers and disagreement points are fixed, different division rules can be Pareto ranked in this 
setting. 
I next turn to an examination of sources of conflict. Using the basic setting established earlier, 
I first review both well-known and less well-known sources of conflict, including indivisibilities, 
incomplete information about various aspects of the environment within which the adversaries operate, and differential beliefs (or, priors) that the adversaries may have. I then examine a much 
less discussed class of dynamic sources of conflict. Conflict and settlement or “War” and “Armed 
Peace” can have very different strategic implications for the future. War tends to provide 
compounding rewards to the winner well into the future, whereas Armed Peace tends to preserve 
the status quo. It is then possible for War to be preferable by one or both adversaries in such 
dynamic settings. I Illustrate the point with a particular model and then discuss its empirical 
relevance with historical examples. 
Throughout the paper, the adversaries are considered unitary actors who have the capability of 
maximizing their own payoff. Conflict and settlement in practice when the adversaries are 
collectivities can also be determined by the internal politics within each adversary’s constituency, 
but I do not examine this potentially important determinant of conflict and settlement.
3
THE BASIC SETTING 
Throughout the paper I will consider two sides,  A and B , competing for a prize that can be 
either exogenous or endogenous to the choices made by them. The strategic variable at each side’s 
disposal is a level of costly “enforcement effort”   (  which in the case of literal warfare 
would stand for levels of arming. The reader though can keep in mind that much of the framework 
and the analysis can apply to other settings of contests, such as litigation (e.g., Hirshleifer and 
Osborne, 2001) or lobbying and rent seeking (Tullock, 1980; Nitzan, 1994). Any combination of 
efforts,   leads to probabilities of winning and losing for the two sides. Let   
denote   winning probability. We suppose   winning probability is increasing in   own effort 
and decreasing in that of its opponent. One wide class of functional forms, for which 
, is the following additive form: 
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where   and   are non-negative, increasing functions and provided  . ) (⋅ A f ) (⋅ B f 0 > B A e e +
4The 
“ratio” or “Tullock” form, whereby   (  has been the workhorse of 
research on conflict and contests.
m
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Enforcement efforts can be thought of as coming from a resource   for each side   so that 
 is left to be used for other (presumably, productive) purposes. In the event of fighting or 
War, the expected payoff of side i could generally be described as follows: 
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 (2) ) , , ( B B i X X T H  is a non-decreasing function of each argument and could stand for a 
composition of utility and production functions.   and   represent exogenous quantities for the 
winner and loser, respectively, of some resource of economic value that the two sides might be 
competing over. The   could represent inputs in a production process, in the event of a win and 
a loss, that would be in general endogenous to the choices of enforcement efforts. 




For the case of simple conflict or rent-seeking under risk neutrality, typically we have 
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and similarly for B . 
Another example of an    function, in which  ) (⋅ i H i i i ih e R e X − = ) (  and   (for both 
 are inputs in a production function: 
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In such a case, the winner receives all the output  ) , ( B B A A e R e R F − −  and the loser receives 
 (typically equal to 0).  (0,0) F
The payoffs in (1) are those in the event of War. If the two sides were to expect to bargain and 
settle in the shadow of War, then these would not be the appropriate payoff functions that should 
determine equilibrium choices of effort. We will analyze both single-period and multi-period 
dynamic games that involve choices of enforcement effort as well as of fighting or settling.   
Regardless of the number of periods, however, in each period we will consider games with the 
following movers: 
• 1. The two sides simultaneously choose enforcement efforts    ). , ( B A e e
• 2. Each side chooses whether to go to War or to engage in bargaining with the aim of 
peacefully settling. If either side chooses to go to War, War occurs with the expected payoffs 
described in (1). 
•3. If both sides choose to bargain, bargaining and settlement may occur. (Depending on how 
the bargaining game is specified and its conditions, War could still be possible.)  
 
Such a sequence of moves is consistent with, and is meant to typify, the sequence of moves 
that adversaries tend to make in actual conflictual conditions: arming takes place before bargaining, 
both as a bargaining tool and as a way of influencing the likelihood of winning if conflict were to 
take place. In general, we would expect different levels of enforcement efforts if the sides were to 
expect War and different levels of the same variables if bargaining and settlement were to be 









It should be emphasized that the bargaining settlements that can occur in this setting are 
conditional on the enforcement levels.  That is, we maintain that contracts on enforcement levels 
are not enforceable. Therefore, in general, because enforcement efforts are costly, the two sides 
cannot expect to reach the “Nirvana” unconstrained Pareto-efficient frontier in Figure 1. Instead, 
given enforcement levels   from stage 1, in stage 2 the two sides would face a bargaining 
game with (2) as the disagreement point (D in Figure 1) and a constrained-efficient frontier as 
depicted.  (In that case, the two sides would always have an incentive to settle.) 









The disagreement point and the constrained efficient frontier are endogenous themselves. An 
increase in the effort of side  A, as depicted in Figure 2, could shift the disagreement payoff of  A in 
his favor, to the detriment of   disagreement payoff, and it would shift the whole frontier to the 
right. That is, with the approach taken here, both the disagreement point – moving from D to D’ --  
and the Pareto frontier over which the two sides would negotiate shift. Where in that space the two 
sides end up would depend both on the production, utility, and contest success functions, as well as 
on the type of game that is expected to be played in stage 3. In other cases, as we shall examine in 
subsequnets sections, there would be no allocations in stage 2 that could avoid War; that is, the 
disagreement point could well be above all point of constrained-efficient frontier. 
s B
'
INCENTIVES TO BARGAIN AND SETTLE 
Why would two armed adversaries both prefer to settle instead of fighting? That is the 
question we ask in this section, and for that we consider the behavior of the two sides in stage 2 of 
the aforementioned sequence of moves. In that stage, the enforcement efforts   have been 
chosen already. To have the possibility of bargaining and settlement, whatever the two sides contest 
must be divisible enough so that War can be avoided. The question then becomes on whether there 
are divisions of the contestable items that could yield payoffs for each side that are at least as high 
as those under War in (2), or that the constrained-efficient frontier is at or above the disagreement 
point. 
) , ( B A e e
As we describe below, there is a variety of economic conditions that would make both sides 
prefer settlement to War. Destruction and other costs brought about by war 
In addition to the cost of arming, War has other costs: spent ammunition and other war 
materiel, destruction of physical objects, injury and death. 
For specificity, suppose both sides are risk neutral, competing for an exogenous prize of value 
T , and the valuation function is as in (3).  Furthermore, suppose each side i would incur an 
additional cost   if they were to go to War and lose. 0) (> i C
6 That is, the expected payoff of going to 
War would be (where  )) , ( B A i i e e p p ≡ : 
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Letting  i β  denote a share of T , side i would accept any division of T  that yields a payoff at 
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Since the second term of the right-hand-side of this inequality is negative, any division of the 
prize  T  in accordance with the winning probabilities (i.e.,  i i p = β  for both   would be 
acceptable to both parties.  However, other divisions of the prize would be acceptable to both 
parties, and the higher are the costs of War relative to the value of the prize (i.e., the higher is the 
ratio 
) , = B A i
),
T
Ci  the greater is the range of divisions of the prize that would be Pareto superior to War. 
Since the range of bargaining alternatives increases with the size of the possible destruction, 
we could also expect less of a chance of fighting if conditions favor to fighting, that we examine 
later, were to be present. Thus, the severe cost of nuclear war had at least an effect on the avoidance 
of such a war thus far, despite other conditions that might have precipitated it. 
Risk aversion 
When the adversaries are individuals or representatives of larger groups, we might expect at 
least some of them—and perhaps almost all of them—to dislike risk and uncertainty.  In other 
words, we would expect the participants to be risk averse. Since, as we have modelled it, War is 
uncertain, risk aversion would be another reason for preferring bargaining and settlement to 
fighting. 
To fix ideas, suppose both sides have as their valuation functions von-Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility functions   and the income of each is linear in the exogenous contested resource  ) (⋅ i U T  and in their own resource  . i i e R −  Expected utilities under War are then: 
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When each side is strictly risk averse, the   are strictly concave and the following 
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Note that   is the (sure) payoff that results from receiving a   share of  ) ( i i i i e R T p U − + i p T . 
We have therefore just shown that the two adversaries strictly prefer to divide the contested 
resource according to the winning probabilities than engaging in War. Other divisions of T  would 
also be Pareto superior to fighting. How wide such a range is would depend on the particular von-
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions—and importantly on the degree of risk aversion—as well 
as on the values of the other parameters ( , and    i R T, ). i e
Diminishing returns 
In much of economics diminishing returns is considered a typical property of production 
processes. If a contestable resource like land is an input in production with diminishing returns, then 
fighting can be expected to lead to outcomes that are suboptimal, with the winner having too much 
of the input and the loser too little relative to an efficient outcome. 
Continue to suppose a resource T  that is the primary bone of contention between the two 
adversaries, but now consider it an input in a production process along with the other resource 
()  each side possesses. That is, we consider a case in which each side produces final output 
by means of a production function   (where 
i i e R −
) , X (t F X  is made out of the other resources of the two 
sides). The expected payoff under War of side i would then be: 
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Since diminishing returns is equivalent to   being strictly concave in both of its 
arguments, we have for all   
) , ( X t F
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Wf
i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i
i i i
V e R F p e R T F p
e R p e R p p T p F
e R T p F
= ) (0, ) (1 ) , ( >
)) )( (1 ) ( )0, (1 ( =
) , (
− − + −
− − + − − +
−
 (7) 
Again, similarly to the case of risk aversion,  ) , ( i i i e R T p F −  is the sure payoff of having a share   of   Both sides would prefer to divide the contested resource according to the winning 
probabilities than going to War. A range of other divisions of the resource would also be Pareto 
superior to War. 
i p . T
Complementarities and efficiency 
Production functions like the one we just examined exhibit complementarities.
7 The same is 
true for utility functions, as   could also be interpreted as a utility function. 
Complementarities, however, between goods that are contested and divided and others that are not 
imply that overall efficiency is not guaranteed if the division of the contested good does not take 
into account such complementarities. 
) , ( X t F
Suppose, for example, in the case of the previous subsection that the two sides were to divide 
T  so that  A receives a   share with the remainder ( A p ) 1 = A B p p −  going to  . B  That is,  A would 
have an endowment of (  and  ) , A A A e R T p − B  an endowment of ( . Although this 
allocation is Pareto-superior to War, nothing guarantees that both sides could not become better off 
by trading some t in exchange for some 
) , B B B e R T p −
. X  Thus, the two sides could potentially improve on 
allocations like those indicated in (7) that exploit just diminishing returns. If   were 
homothetic, efficiency would be guaranteed if and only if the ratios of the two inputs were identical 
(i.e.,










Given that in modern economies goods are highly complementary with other goods, 
complementarity could be an empirically significant factor in avoiding fighting. 
Decreasing returns to scale in production 
In all the valuation functions we have used up to this point, we have supposed an exogenous 
contested resource T.  Suppose now that the contested is a function of the endogenous inputs, so 
that   which is an ordinary production function for which we assume 
 Then, the expected payoff under War would be as follows: 
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(0,0) 0. G =
) , ( = B B A A i
Wg
i e R e R G p V − −  (8) 
If   has decreasing returns to scale, for all  ) , ( B A X X G (0,1) ∈ i p  by definition we must have: 
) , ( > ) ( ), ( ( B B A A i B B i A A i e R e R G p e R p e R p G − − − −  (9) 
Or, again, dividing the contested inputs according to the winning probabilities is Pareto 
superior to fighting it out for the two inputs. 
Cumulatively, the sets of economic reasons for which bargaining and settlement dominate 
fighting is impressive, and one would expect as a result not to have much fighting in practice.  
Nevertheless, wars and other lower-level forms of conflict, including litigation, have been and continue to be routine. Perhaps with one exception—that of decreasing returns—bargaining and 
settlement would be the expected outcome in rich, modern, economies with high complementarities 
in production and consumption, high costs of conflict, or risk averse attitudes. Yet war overtook 
high-income countries with a vengeance in the first half of the 20
th century. Although we cannot 
provide much of an argument why specific wars have occurred in this paper, we will examine 
various reasons for fighting. Before doing so, however, we will briefly touch another issue: that of 
the enforcement levels when the sides expect to bargain and settle with probability one. 
ARMING FOR SETTLEMENT: THE ROLE OF BARGAINING 
NORMS 
Thus far, we have only shown the incentive to bargain and settle, instead of going to War, in 
stage 2 of the sequence of 3 stages by which we have described a plausible environment of arming, 
fighting, and settling. Given settings with complete information in which settlement would be part 
of any subgame perfect equilibrium, how large enforcement efforts would the two adversaries 
choose in stage 1 of the process? Does the expectation of a negotiated settlement reduce their 
arming compared to the case of War? Given that there are many possible negotiated settlements and 
rules of division, which ones would the two sides be expected to use? Are there any rules of 
division that are better than others and in what sense? 
To begin answering such questions, we need to know—and the two sides would need to know 
and agree upon—a rule of division (or, bargaining solution, or bargaining norm) at stage 3. That is, 
big parts of the answers to the questions just posed above would depend on how the two sides 
expect to behave when they finally settle, and we need to specify both a particular model with a 
valuation function, a rule of division in stage 3, and the resultant payoff functions. 
For simplicity and tractability, we consider a variation of the model where settlement is 
always preferred by the two players because War has additional costs. Here, however, we suppose 
that the costs of War are proportional to T , instead of additive. In particular, we suppose that if the 
two sides were to go to War, the winner would only win  T θ  of the contested resource where 
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These expected payoffs only specify what would occur under disagreement (War), which would 
never occur in equilibrium. The payoffs under “Armed Peace” in stage 3 can be specified as 
follows: B B B A B A
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where by   we represent a rule of division which, in general, should depend on the 
enforcement efforts chosen by the two sides.  In particular, we consider the following class of rules 
parametrized by 
) , ( B A e e
γ β
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This class of rules includes the following three possibilities: 
a. ( 0) = γ  When T  is divided in half regardless of each side’s choice of enforcement effort. 
This is an example of a rule of division that is independent of the disagreement payoff of each side. 












 for    ). B
c.( ) =θ γ  When the insecure income is divided according to any symmetric axiomatic 
bargaining solution (including the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions) where the disagreement 
payoffs are those under fighting described in (10).
9
In addition, given risk neutrality, γ  can also be interpreted as a (common) prior probability 
that the two sides might have about the rule of division that will be used in stage 3. That is, the 
parametrization in (12) allows for uncertainty that the two sides could have about the rule of 
division that they might use. 
The payoffs in (11) along with a division rule in (12) constitute a well-defined game. The 
Nash equilibrium choices of enforcement efforts, denoted by ( , are the following:  ) ,
γ γ
B A e e
T e e e B A 4
= =
γ γ γ γ ≡  (13) 
The corresponding equilibrium payoffs under Armed Peace are: 
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Note how both enforcement efforts and equilibrium payoffs depend on the rule of division or 
bargaining norm parameter  . γ  If the disagreement payoff and enforcement efforts play no role in 
dividing the surplus ( 0 = γ ), no enforcement efforts are chosen and payoffs are maximal, with the 
contested resource simply divided in half. As more weight is given to the disagreement point in 
bargaining (γ  is rising), more resources are expended on enforcement and less income is left for 
consumption or other purposes. From the point of view of economic theory, the division rule with  θ γ =  appears the best 
justified, as it corresponds to any symmetric bargaining solution. However, when the Pareto frontier 
in bargaining is strictly concave, different bargaining solutions would yield different enforcement 
efforts in equilibrium and it is possible that such solutions could even Pareto-ranked under certain 
conditions. Anbarci, Skaperdas, Syropoulos (2002) have performed such a comparison and found 
that bargaining solutions that put more weight on disagreement utilities indeed produce more 
equilibrium enforcement effort and lead to lower equilibrium payoffs.
10 Thus, bargaining norms 
have been shown to have real effects in more complex economic environments than the one 
examined here and, if anything, the effects appear to be as strong or stronger than in the simple case 
with linear Pareto frontiers. 
The equilibrium enforcement efforts under War (i.e., with the payoffs in (10)) are identical for 
the two sides and equal  T e
4
=
θ θ . Note that these efforts under War are lower than the enforcement 
efforts under Armed Peace whenever  . >θ γ  Moreover, it is even possible for the equilibrium 
payoff under Armed Peace to be lower than that under War. That occurs whenever  , 2 > θ γ −  which 
is true only if  1 > γ  and would therefore involve a very high weight on the the disagreement point. 
The effect of norms on arming that we have identified here also concerns a recent debate 
within the field of international relations between “constructivists” and “realists” (or, “neorealists”) 
about the effect of norms. Realists view the world of interaction between states as anarchic where 
military power is the overwhelming, if not the sole, determinant of success and survival as a state.
11 
Constructivists emphasize the role of international social and cultural norms regarding interactions 
between states, including the role of such norms in bringing about or preventing war (see, e.g., 
Wendt, 1999). What we have shown is that norms have an important economic role to play even in 
an anarchic world. Military power cannot determine solely all power since there are typically too 
many possible agreements that can take place in the shadow of War, and that is for given levels of 
military power. Different norms about how the mutual gains from not fighting are shared can lead 
to radically different levels of arming, without essentially changing the relative military power of 
the adversaries, thus increasing the economic pie of each side in a non-zero sum fashion. Therefore, 
a constructivist approach, with its emphasis on norms, and a realist approach, based on rational-
choice, are not fundamentally incompatible and can be fruitfully combined. 
REVIEWING SOME SOURCES OF CONFLICT 
Having examined the incentives to bargain and settle in the shadow of War as well as the role 
of bargaining norms when settlement occurs, we turn to possible reasons that induce fighting. In 
this section we review a number of causes of fighting that have appeared in different literatures, using the framework of the first main section of the paper. In the next section we examine some 
reasons for fighting that emerge in dynamic environments that are empirically important but have 
not received much attention. 
For ease of reference in the remainder of this section, we reproduce the sequence of moves 
from section 1: 
• 1. The two sides simultaneously choose enforcement efforts    ). , ( B A e e
• 2.  Each side chooses whether to go to War or to engage in bargaining with the aim of 
peacefully settling. If either side chooses to go to War, War occurs with the expected payoffs 
described in (1). 
•3.  If both sides choose to bargain, bargaining and settlement may occur. (Depending on how 
the bargaining game is specified and its conditions, War could still be possible.)  
 
 
Advance commitment to fight 
One or both adversaries could possibly engage in a burn-the-bridges act (Schelling, 1960) that 
would eliminate the possibility of negotiation in stages 2 and 3. That could take place in advance of 
stage 1, by commiting to War, so as to preclude the possible temptation of choosing to settle if the 
two sides were actually to negotiate in stage 2. There are at least two substantive reasons why such 
a pre-commitment could occur. 
First, it is possible that the ordinary equilibrium payoff under War could be higher than the 
equilibrium payoff under Armed Peace for at least one side. We have shown such a theoretical 
possibility in the previous section and it can occur only when the weight of the division rule on the 
disagreement payoff is abnormally high. Other, more involved, models could share such an 
attribute, depending on the type of rule of division that is used. 
Second, the adversaries could have negative interdependence of payoffs due to emotional 
dislike or hatred of one another in ways that would differentially favor War over Armed Peace. 
(Hirshleifer, 1995, discusses in more detail how this could occur.) That is, speaking with the enemy 
creates additional disutility so that, even in the presence of factors that would otherwise make 
settlement preferable, commiting to War would be ex ante more preferable to Armed Peace. 
Indivisibilities 
In the analysis of settlement in the two previous sections, we have assumed that whatever is 
contested by the two sides is perfectly divisible. If the contested object is imperfectly divisible, then 
War could ensue because the object could be indivisible for the values that dominate War. If the 
contested object is completely indivisible, then War would occur because that would be left as the 
sole feasible alternative.
12In a world with money, compensation could be offered by one party to the other in exchange 
for the contested object even if that were indivisible. For example, Fearon (1995, p.389) states: 
“Before the age of nationalism, princes bought, sold, and partitioned land. In the nineteenth century 
the United States purchased the Louisiana territory from France, and Alaska from Russia, and as 
late as 1898 President McKinley explored the possibility of buying Cuba from Spain in order to 
avoid a war over it.” 
Thus, War can be the outcome of indivisibilities only if (i) money and a substitute does not 
exist or (ii) there are liquidity constraints that prevent the use of money or substitutes or (iii) if the 
contested object is not exchangeable for money or other substitutes. (i) and (ii) might have been true 
often in earlier times when hoarded commodity money—gold and other precious metals—might 
have been insufficient to buy off intruders and rivals. The uncompromising contestation of the same 
territory be rival ethnic groups could be considered an example of (iii). However, in the case of 
ethnic groups it is unclear whose preferences are relevant (or, should be relevant). For different 
members of the same ethnic group typically have different attitudes towards the importance of 
particular pieces of territory; for each uncompromising member there could easily be many others 
who are willing to be compensated in other dimensions for a loss of ancestral land. 
Increasing returns 
Indivisibility is a limiting case of increasing returns. If the production function   we 
examined earlier exhibits increasing returns, the inequality in (9) is reversed so that 
) , ( B A X X G
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Then, each side would prefer the risk of War to dividing the two inputs according to the 
winning probabilities, and no other feasible division of the inputs would be possible. Of course, the 
same result would hold for increasing returns in other types functions; for example, if the function 
, examined earlier, were strictly convex in t.  ) , ( X t F
Given that indivisibility is a special case of increasing returns, increasing returns as a possible 
contributor to fighting is at least as empirically plausible as indivisibilities are. Whole plains and 
valleys did not have an advantage when they belonged to a single state instead of more not because 
of indivisibilities but likely more due to the increasing returns brought about by a better unified 
irrigation and transportation infrastructure. 
Risk-seeking preferences 
Those who like risk or have risk-seeking preferences, by definition, will take a risk than its 
expected value. That is, if the function  ) (⋅ i U  is strictly convex (for risk-seeking preferences) we 
have:  
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Therefore, a risk averse side would prefer to fight than divide the contested resource 
according to the winning probabilities. However, if the other side were sufficiently risk averse, 
there could still be a division of the contested resource that the risk-seeking side, as well as the risk 
averse one, would find preferable to War. That is, having just one of the sides being risk-seeking is 
not sufficient for War to take place. Of course, having both sides being risk-seekers would be 
sufficient for War. 
Risk-seeking behavior is considered far from being typical for humans. There is no 
presumption, or evidence that I am aware of, that leaders of states who make decisions about war 
and peace are less risk averse than others. Was Hitler a risk seeker or could his behavior be 
explained by the many other available hypothesis. Taking into account the seeming absence of 
evidence on the topic, I would conjecture that risk seeking behavior has not or is not an important 
cause of conflict. 
Incomplete information 
By far, the most analyzed and discussed cause of fighting within the rational-choice approach 
involves different types of incomplete information. Up to this point, we have assumed that both 
sides have complete information about each others’ payoffs, the conflict technology, the strength of 
one another, as well as of all other pertinent details of the nature of the game. Any uncertainty about 
any of those aspects of the game would imply incomplete information. 
In such a game, the two sides are assumed to have common knowledge of the priors (i.e., 
common probabilities) regarding that aspect of the game over which there is uncertainty. For 
example, in stage 2 the two sides might not know one another’s true strength (in terms, for example, 
of the amount of arms the other side have and, therefore, of their winning probabilities). Each side 
would have a probability distribution over the other side’s strength and that probability distribution 
is known by the other side (and, in turn, that knowledge is known by its opponent, and so on, so as 
for that knowledge to be common). Under such conditions, one or both sides might choose to fight 
in stage 2 if they feel they are strong and their opponent also turns out to be stronger that expected, 
so that War could stochastically emerge as part of a regular equilibrium.  (For such models, see 
Brito and Intriligator, 1985 or Bester and Warneryd, 2006.) 
The absence of complete information about relative power has been traditionally considered 
an empirically important source of conflict (see Fearon, 1995, for an overview). The problem is not 
just the one discussed, which involves no communication between the two parties, but also when there is a possibility of communication and signalling one’s strength, which sometimes might 
involve misrepresentation, bluffing, and fighting as a result of such attempts. As Sanchez-Pages 
(2004) has shown in a sequential setting, some preliminary fighting might take place in order for the 
opponents to learn about each others’ strengths. In such a case, we would not expect a too-
prolonged fighting. 
Different priors 
As we just mentioned above, in traditional games with incomplete information the two sides 
are supposed to have the same priors regarding any uncertainty about the nature of the game. The 
reason for this assumption (called sometimes the Harsanyi doctrine) is that if the two sides did not 
have the same priors but were allowed to communicate their own priors to one another they would 
eventually learn to agree on a common prior (or, rather, a common posterior—see Samuelson, 
2004). However, such a procedure assumes that communication is costless, an assumption that is 
clearly empirically difficult to satisfy. As a result, we can expect different sides, especially those 
with different experiences that cannot be easily communicated to one another, would have different 
priors about the different possibilities about the other side’s strength and other characteristics. 
When the difference in priors is characterized by over-optimism, in the sense that one or both sides 
think of themselves as stronger than they are objectively and their opponents as weaker than they 
could objectively be, War could occur. 
The sources of conflict we have discussed thus far occur in one-period, timeless settings. The 
various types of incomplete information that can exist tend to be considered by far the most 
important, if not sole, source of actual conflicts, even though I know of no systematic studies that 
have made in-depth comparisons of alternative hypotheses for the causes of particular conflicts. I 
now turn to a class of potential sources of conflict that has to do with the long-term, differential 
strategic effects of War and Armed Peace that has not received as much scrutiny as incomplete 
information but has the potential of being empirically significant. 
FORWARD-LOOKING, STRATEGIC SOURCES OF CONFLICT 
War does not just determine today’s winner. It also changes the strategic positions of the 
adversaries in the future. The winner can be expected to be stronger in the future and the loser 
weaker. For example, the winner of a battle or war for territory will not just receive the current 
income of that territory; it will also be able to use the extra resources of that territory to increase 
arming in the future, while preventing its adversary from doing so, and therefore gain a strategic 
advantage well into the future.  In another very different context—litigation—going to court, 
instead of settling out of court, clarifies the property rights of the winner and brings other benefits, 
including deterring lawsuits that might be filed solely with the intent of extracting settlement 
payments. Bargaining and settlement, on the other hand, tends not to change the future strategic positions of the adversaries and maintain the status quo. It is possible, then, for War to be an 
equilibrium phenomenon in such dynamic settings. 
Specifically, when (i) the future strategic implications of War and Armed Peace are very 
different from one another and (ii) no long-term disarmament contracts are possible,
13 then War 
could occur even if it brings about destruction (or, in the presence of other factors that induce 
settlement). We will demonstrate this possibility in a dynamic version of the model of section 3 in 
which the winner of War receives permanent possession of the contested resource with some it 
destroyed, whereas Armed Peace induces a division of the resource but entail arming in every 
period. What is essentially traded off is the long-term destruction that War induces versus the 
permanent need for arming that Armed Peace necessitates.
14 We will then discuss how this dynamic 
source of conflict might be distinguishable from incomplete information in particular historical 
instances of conflict. 
War versus armed peace in a dynamic setting 
Consider an indefinite horizon setting in which the single-period payoff is as in (10).  That is, 
there is a contested resource T  which loses a portion  θ − 1  of its value if War were to occur. For 
notational convenience, we assume   for both 
15 0 = i R . , = B A i  In each period, the two sides follow 
the same sequence of moves we have supposed up to this point: first, they choose enforcement 
efforts and then make choices between War and Armed Peace. If, however, they were to engage in 
War, its outcome would be permanent, in the sense that the winner would capture the contested 
resource thereafter, although in each period he would only receive a fraction of its benefit ( ) T θ . 
War, then, has a cost that is borne by the winner forever. Nevertheless, since War decides the 
winner once for all, there would be no enforcement efforts in future periods. By contrast, Armed 
Peace involves a division of the contested resource in each period without any loss of the contested 
resource, but it can be expected to typically involve some arming so as to better each side’s 
bargaining position. Thus, whether War or Armed Peace prevails largely depends on the costs of 
War versus the extra enforcement effort that is chosen under Armed Peace. 
We examine each of the two possibilities, War and Armed Peace, separately first. Under War, 
letting  (0,1) ∈ δ  denote the identical discount factor for the two sides, the expected payoff of side   
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The equilibrium expected payoff of both sides then becomes: 
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To examine the case of Armed Peace, we first need to specify a division rule for stage 3 of 
each period that two sides negotiate. As we have seen in section 3, there are many such rules that 
could be adopted with different rules yielding potentially different equilibrium efforts and payoffs. 
Since both sides are risk neutral, all symmetric bargaining solutions prescribed the same rule of 
division and I will use that rule here. The qualitative findings that are reported below, however, do 
not depend on that rule. Let   the continuation peace payoff of side i in a particular 
period (time subscripts are suppressed for notational clarity); that payoff depends on the choice of 
enforcement efforts,   as it affects the probabilities of winning and losing but the cost of the 
effort of each side is considered sunk and not included in  . Also, let   denote 
the continuation War payoff of side, which is the disagreement payoff in this case. This payoff also 
does not include each side’s cost of enforcement effort (which in general would differ from that in 
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i . Then, the symmetric rule prescribes equal 
division of the surplus, or that: 
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We next need to specify the continuation peace payoffs  . Because we employ the 
notion of Markov perfect equilibrium, we suppose that, under Armed Peace, the two sides will 
choose in all future periods a particular combination of such equilibrium efforts, denoted by 
 and choose current period efforts optimally given these future efforts. Associated with 











A we denote by 
 with the share of  ,
p β B  thus being  . Then, for a current-period share of 
p β − 1 A denoted by β  
(which can in general be different from   the continuation Armed peace payoff for side  )
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Using these two expressions in (18) along with the continuation War payoffs for each side 
















































The only part of   that depends on efforts is the first component, with the rest of the 
component not influencing the choice of equilibrium effort. That first component includes the 






 which represents the discounted value of the 
non-destruction share θ .
16  That is, the rule of division derived is rather sensitive to discounting of 
the future, with greater sensitivity when the future is highly valued. The reason for this 
characteristic is that the rule of division (see (18)) is sensitive to the disagreement payoff, which in 
turns depend on the expected future discounted payoff under War. In addition, note that we should 
eventually have  . With all this preparation, we are now ready to specify the relevant 
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Then, we can calculate that the Markov perfect equilibrium choices of effort are identical (and 
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Most significantly, note that these equilibrium efforts involve a cost that is one quarter of the total 
discounted benefits of using the contested resource, taking account of the shrinkage that would occur in the event of War. With a high enough discount factor (high  ) δ  and a low enough 
destruction induced by War (high θ ), the total surplus for one period could be lower than the total 







T , or when 
) 2(1 > δ θ −  (20) 
In such a case the equilibrium payoff under Armed Peace would be negative, not just lower 
than the expected payoff under War in (17). Both sides, as will be shown below, would prefer to 
fight it out in stage when (20) is satisfied, although the range of parameters for which such an 
outcome would occur is wider than that suggested by (20). 
To determine whether War or Armed Peace takes place, consider stage 2 for the choice of 





.  Since these efforts are sunk, 
we need to compare the continuation payoffs under Armed Peace versus those under War. Since, 
given the enforcement efforts, these payoffs are symmetric, the comparison is the same for both 

































whereas the expected continuation payoff under War is 
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Therefore, War will occur if and only
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Thus when destruction when War occurs is not too high (θ  is high enough) and the discount 
factor  δ  is high enough, War occurs.
18 A higher discount factor, by making the future more 
important, induces higher enforcement costs that need to be paid in every period in order to maintain each side’s bargaining position. These costs then have to be compared to the cost of War, 
which involves some permanent loss of the value of the contested resource. This comparison of the 
two types of costs does not depend on the particular structure we have assumed here or on winner-
take-all nature of War.
19 I close the presentation of this illustrative model, with some observations 
regarding the effects of long-term, strategic concerns as a source of conflict by incorporating ideas 
and findings from other related research: 
• War can have very different strategic implications than Armed Peace has, in ways that in the 
absence of long-term contracting on arming, War could well be the equilibrium outcome despite its 
costs. 
• One factor in inducing War is that, in order to maintain a proper bargaining position, Armed 
Peace can be very expensive in terms of the resources that it requires for arming. 
• Low destruction and other costs of War (as well as relatively unimportant other incentives 
for Armed Peace) increase the likelihood of War. 
• High importance attached to future payoffs also tend to induce War.  
 
This last observation is opposite to that predicted by folk-theorem arguments, according to 
which a higher importance attached to the future (i.e., higher discount factors) tends to induce more 
cooperative behavior. It should be emphasized that folk-theorem arguments do not predict the 
necessity of cooperation but only its possibility, among many possibilities. In settings with high 
levels of distrust, like the ones envisaged in our setting, where long-term explicit disarmament 
contracts are difficult or impossible to enforce, the implementation of supergame strategies requires 
a measure of trust on adversaries that I think would be difficult to maintain. Folk-theorem 
arguments and supergame strategies would be more appropriate for settings in which parties already 
have developed methods of communication and levels of trust so that the contemplated, highly 
contingent supergame strategies would continue to be followed in the future. 
Is the shadow of the future empirically relevant? 
There is little doubt that various forms of incomplete information as well as disagreement 
about the nature of the game (in the sense of having different priors) that potential adversaries play 
are relevant in explaining the break-up of many conflicts. For example, there is no doubt that there 
was much confusion that European states and their leaders had about what was happening in the 
summer of 1914 that led to World War I. (See Ch. 2 in Joll, 1992, or Ch. 3 in Keegan, 2000.) 
Especially because the lead times from initial mobilization to actual readiness were large, and in the 
intervening time each country was very vulnerable to attack, it was easy to make the decision for 
initial mobilization—and lead others to do the same and, therefore, to war—with very limited 
information about other states’ predispositions.
20 But was World War I just a calculated mistake based on incomplete information? 
It would be fruitless to argue here that Germany or France were determined to go to war, each 
for their own reasons; the former in order to loosen the perceived stranglehold of the other 
established empires on its own imperial ambitions, the latter in order to gain back Alsace and 
Lorraine as well as for defending its own empire. What is perhaps easier to argue that incomplete 
information is not the whole story, is to consider that there was no peace after it became obvious to 
almost everyone that trench warfare brought stalemate and not quick victory. With trench warfare 
much of the initial incomplete information dissipated, the costs of the war continuing were 
horrendous with not much end in sight and yet war continued. Reasonably, it could be argued that 
each side saw the chance of eventual dominance well into the future as the carrot that kept the war 
going. 
Even more compelling for the arguments made in this section was the endgame of World War 
II. Why didn’t the United States settle for the advantageous peace that Japan was bidding for?  Why 
did the Soviet Union push so hard, and at such cost, in the Eastern front?  Why were the Western 
allies rushing in the Western front?  Certainly it could not be because they were not aware of 
Japan’s or Germany’s strength or the other way around. The allies were all looking into the future. 
They wanted the Axis powers crushed without the possibility of even a remote comeback, as it 
happened with Germany after World War I. They were also eyeing one another, jockeying for 
position in the post-war period - the Cold War had effectively started considerably before the end of 
the actual hot war. 
Since the Second World War, civil wars have been much more common than interstate wars. 
With an average duration of over seven years (Collier et. al., 2003), by that time both incomplete 
information and the costs of war become apparent. Similarly, civil wars within Northern Italian 
city-states in late medieval times often lasted for decades with tremendous costs to the participants 
(see, for the case of Genoa, Greif, 1998).  Before attributing all such conflicts to irrationality, 
obstinacy, or deep hatred, the gamble on gaining long-term advantage over opponents again appears 
as at least another, complementary to others, explanation of the many civil wars that have occurred. 
Non-military types of conflict are also subject to the similar logic. Litigants go to court, 
instead of pursuing out-of-court settlements, not just because of incomplete information (or for the 
other static sources of conflict that we examined in the previous section). They seek once-and-for 
all resolutions of their disputes as the winner can expect to have a firmer grasp over what is under 
dispute well into the future. Unions strike and firms can engage in lockouts frequently because the 
eventual outcome can be expected to establish a “pattern” for the rest of the industry or even the 
country. There is little theoretical or empirical work that takes account of these dynamic aspects of 
conflict and settlement and, in the least, they deserve more scrutiny than they have hitherto received. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It is very rare that any particular economic, social, or historical event can have a single 
explanation. It would be surprising that if particular wars or periods of peace could be due to just a 
single factor. There are pros and cons for different views and the evidence is often inconclusive so 
as to never convince all informed researchers. For example, the seeming economic interdependence 
of the first era of globalization before 1914 made war unthinkable for many observers at the time, as 
they perceived the benefits of settlement definitively higher than those of war. Yet war occurred 
with a vengeance and, at least initially, with enthusiasm. Was it the slow information transmission 
or the lack of it that caused that war?  Was it irrationality and blind nationalism? Or, were long-term 
calculations involved, with irrationality and blind nationalism possibly strategically manipulated 
and used as smokescreens? Besides the evidence, its weighing much depends on how we view the 
same evidence with the theoretical framework we use. With such thoughts in mind, I have tried to 
systematically present some main determinants of conflict and settlement using the contest 
approach that Jack Hirshleifer introduced and developed for the study of conflict. I have put some 
more emphasis than is customary on long-term, strategic effects, of course not because I believe 
they are the sole explanation of conflict but because of the received overemphasis of incomplete 
information as being so. •  I would like to thank Vimal Kumar and Marty McGuire for their help. 
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1 The first paper on the topic was Hirhsleifer (1988). Hirshleifer (1995) provides and overview, including a discussion 
of the factors that contribute to conflict and settlement. 
 
2 Jack used these terms in personal communications. To my knowledge, he did not use these words in print. 
 
3 Garfinkel (1994) and Hess and Orphanides (1995) are two pioneering studies that examine, respectively, positive and 
negative aspect of internal politics with regard to conflict. 
 
4 When   if  , the probabilities of winning for the two sides equal some constants   
and 1 . 
5 Hirsheifer (1989) analyzes the properties of this and another well-known functional form (where  ; 
). For an overview of contest success functions, see section 2 of Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2006). 
6 If the winner were to pay a cost as well, the effect of destruction as a contributor to settlement would be stronger. 
There are of course other ways to model costs, without changing the basic finding that bargaining and settlement are 
preferable to War. In fact, in sections 3 and 5 we examine a variation in which the costs of War are proportional to T . 
 
7 In this particular case, complementarity is implied by a positive cross-partial derivative. 
8 Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2002) have examined whether concentrating on the larger bargaining set is actually ex 
ante efficient or not, and found that it is not in general. The reason is that the larger set could encourage too many 
enforcement costs in equilibirum so as to counteract the ordinary allocative efficency. 
 
9 All symmetric axiomatic solutions yield the same outcome because the Pareto frontier is linear in this case.  
Furthermore, this solution would also be the limiting outcome of alternating-offers (Rubinstein) noncooperative games 
with symmetric costs (see, for example, Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990; Muthoo, 1999). 
10 The solutions that are compared are parametrized by their relative weights that they put on the diagreement and 
"utopia" points. This approach allowed for the comparison of bargaining solutions like the Kalai-Smorodinsky, Equal 
Sacrifice, and Equal division. Because this last solution puts all its weight on the disagreement point, it performs the 
worst, whereas the Equal Sacrifice solution, as it puts all its weight on the utopia point, it performs best.  The Nash 
bargaining solution has a different structure and could not be compared to these solutions.  However, in simulations it 
performed similarly to the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. 
 
11 See Waltz (1979) for a defining text or Mearsheimer (2001) for the version of "offensive" realism. 
12 Hirshleifer, Boldrin, and Levine (2005) examine the role of indivisibilities in more detail than I do here. 
13 Sometimes, this second conditions is referred to as an inability to commit (see Fearon, 1995). 
14 McBride and Skaperdas (2006) examine a similar infinite-horizon model, in which War has costs only in the current 
period, whereas in the model below War has costs over the whole horizon, leading to somewhat different comparative 
statics. McBride and Skaperdas (2006) also have analyzed the case of multiple battles when arming (enforcement costs)  
are exogenous. In addition to Fearon (1995), who first discussed the dynamic sources of conflict we examine here 
include a number of other recent papers. Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000) analyzed a finite-horizon model and Powell 
(2004) identified some of the possible sources of conflict in an infinite horizon setting. Robson and Skaperdas (2002) 
showed how litigants could go to court as a way of clarifying property rights. Hirshleifer et al (2005) also showed the 
possibility of conflict in an infinite horizon model when the payoff functions have particular forms of time dependence. 
Bester and Konrad (2004, 2005) demonstrated how large asymmetries in power or expectations of future equality can 
induce warfare 
15 There is no loss in generality for this assumption as long as there are no liquidity constraints and each side can exert 
the (interior) equilibirum effort. 









17 We can assume that when the two quantities are equal, Armed Peace is chosen by convention. 
18 As mentioned abover, tt can be confirmed that (21) is implied by (20). That is, rather obviously, when the payoff 
under Armed Peace is negative, War is necessarily chosen in stage 2. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
• 
19 Fearon (1995) and Powell (2004) have discussed and analyzed the broader issues, especially relative to the 
political science literature. McBride and Skaperdas (2006) examine the case in which it takes more that one battle 
to win the war, but when enforcement costs are exogenous. 
20 It shoud be note, though, that temporary offense-dominance that early mobiization provided, could lead to what is 
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